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Abstract: The article discusses a challenge to the traditional intentional-causalist conceptions of action and 
intentionality as well as to our everyday and legal conceptions of responsibility, namely the psychological discovery 
that the greatest part of our alleged actions are performed automatically, i.e. unconsciously and without a proximal 
intention causing and sustaining them. The main part of the article scrutinises several mechanisms of automatic 
behaviour, how they work and whether the resulting behaviour is an action: actions caused by distal implementation 
intentions, four types of habit and habitualisation, mimicry and semantically induced automatic behaviour (which, 
however later is disregarded because of its unclarity). According to the intentional-causalist criterion, the automatic 
behaviours resulting from all but one of these mechanisms turn out to be actions and intentional; and even the 
behaviour resulting from the remaining mechanism (naturally acquired habits) is something we can be responsible for. 
Hence, the challenge, seen from close up, does not really call the traditional conception of action and intentionality into 
question. 
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1. The Topic: Automatic Behaviour, Agency and Responsibility 
The most widely accepted classical conception of action is intentional causalism: An action (in the 
strict sense) is a behaviour caused (in a non-deviant way [Lumer 2008]) by a respective intention; 
and to be really ours the intention has to be volitive, i.e. a (in principle) rationalisable integration of 
our conscious attitudes towards the action, and hence conscious or preconscious. The philosophical 
reason for intentional causalism, apart from its (arguable) empirical reality [cf. Lumer 2007], is that 
it explains the value of actions, namely that actions conceived in this way give practical power to 
our conscious ego: make it control our behaviour and thereby change pieces of the world for 
realising our desires and implementing the decisions of our reason. Conscious intentions are pivotal 
in this conception. On the one hand, they represent the upshot of the subject's reflection, the 
balancing of his desires, the integration of his various attitudes towards the options and express the 
concerns of the person and thereby also the personality itself. On the other, intentions have 
executive power to realise the intended behaviour and piece of the world by causing the intended 
behaviour. [Lumer 2013.] The intentional-causalist conception has not only been dominant in the 
history of philosophy – from Aristotle via Hume, Kant to e.g. Davidson – it is also prevalent in 
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everyday thinking of actions, and it is the basis of criminal, civil as well as moral responsibility in 
its usual meaning and hence also of the criminal justice system (cf. e.g. Kenny 1978; Vargas 2013). 
Now, recent findings in cognitive and neurosciences have challenged this picture in various 
ways. One of these challenges is that most of our actions are automatic, hence not at all caused by a 
proximal intention. The article discusses this challenge: What kinds of automatic behaviour are 
there? How do they function? Is the resulting behaviour still intentional and, therefore, still an 
action in the strict sense? Are we or can we be responsible for our automatic behaviour? 
In the following, first, the challenge is explained more in detail (sect. 2). Next, considering 
the topic of the present article, a working definition of ‘automatic behaviour’ is developed, which 
delineates the object under study (sect. 3). The article's main part then distinguishes various types 
of automatic behaviour, analyses the underlying mechanisms 1 and, on this basis, assesses the 
potential intentionality and the agential character of the resulting behaviour as well as our potential 
responsibility for it (sects. 4-7). Then some alternative philosophical explanations of automatic 
behaviour are criticised (sect. 8). After recapping that much of automatic behaviour is still 
intentional and that we are also responsible for a large part of the non-agential automatic behaviour, 
the questions of intentionality and responsibility are examined in more detail, in particular by 
differentiating various types of responsibility and by answering objections. If we are responsible for 
so much of our automatic behaviour this is a chance but also a burden (sects. 9-10). 
2. The Challenge of Automatic Behaviour for Agency and Responsibility 
Most of our actions are automatic in the sense of being triggered by a consciously or unconsciously 
perceived signal that sets in motion an automatism of executing certain actions, where this 
automatism works smoothly and effortlessly and does not require conscious attention [cf. e.g. 
Bargh & Chartrand 1999, 463; Neumann 1984, 282]. Someone scratches his head or twists his 
beard; a driver shifts gears at a certain pitch or she drives while listening to the news; a daughter is 
telling long stories to her father while taking a walk; a trained typist is talking to her colleague 
while copying a text [Kihlstrom 1987, 1447]; a writer sets down the single words of a sentence 
while still pondering whether the formulation is good. Some psychologists say that only 5% of our 
actions are consciously controlled, the rest is automatic [Baumeister et al. 1998, 1252; Baumeister 
& Sommer 1997]. This holds for that reason alone that that the majority of adults' actions are 
molecular actions, which are composed of smaller molecules and finally atomic actions, where the 
atoms are triggered and executed automatically. 
But are seemingly automatic actions really without intention or at least not triggered by a 
proximal intention? At first glance this seems hard to believe. So let us consider some empirical 
findings. It is common knowledge and the basis of the respective practice in learning, e.g. to drive a 
car or to play a musical instrument, that we can unburden our attention by repeating and training 
                                                 
1
  “Mechanism” here is meant in the sense of: “the fundamental fixed causal processes responsible for some 
(repeating) phenomenon” [cf. Babcock Gove 1993, mechanism 4.a]. 
LUMER: Automatic Actions – Agency, Intentionality, and Responsibility 3 
smaller chunks of behaviour thus automatizing it so that we are later able to use our attention for 
other tasks [Bargh & Chartrand 1999, 468]. And it is part of common knowledge that if we later 
focus our attention again on the details, the overarching action often is severely disturbed – it can 
e.g. be dangerous to run down a staircase and in the middle to start to mind one’s single steps. 
Several sorts of action slips (Norman 1981) are another everyday evidence for the lack of proximal 
conscious intention in many actions: Ambiguous stimuli of automatic actions may trigger the false 
action precisely because the triggering is not consciously controlled – an urban bus driver driving 
his private car along his bus route may swing out to stop at the bus stop [Heckhausen 1987, 157], 
somebody going into her bedroom to dress for dinner may end up in bed for sleeping [James 1890, 
I, 115]. Bad habits are further evidence of common knowledge for the lack of conscious intentions 
in automatic actions as they may persist against our prior intention to stop them. Psychological 
research has revealed that bad habits, unlike responses to temptations, are controlled most 
effectively through spontaneous use of vigilant monitoring (thinking “don’t do it,” watching 
carefully for slip-ups) [Quinn et al. 2010, 499]. This means, that precisely because there is no 
conscious attention to the topic the bad habit can do its work. The evidences for the lack of 
conscious (proximal) intentions cited so far are still indirect and one may question them. Therefore, 
some empirical research tries to show that in several cases there cannot be a respective conscious 
proximal intention for automatic action. One way of doing this is to ensure that not even the trigger 
gets conscious before the action, so that the subject still less can form a proximal conscious 
intention as a reaction to it. The simplest cases are fast reactions like starting to sprint: Professional 
sprinters start to run before they can have consciously heard the starting shot: the lapse of time for 
building the conscious perception of a signal, as established in other experiments (300-500 ms), is 
longer than the sprinter’s objectively measured reaction time (50-100 ms) [Libet 1985, 559]. 
Probably there was a distal conscious intention to ‘run immediately after the starting shot’ but not a 
proximal intention, formed after the shot. Another way, used in the lab, to show the lack of a 
proximal intention is to operate with an unperceivable trigger – as in experiments demonstrating the 
Fehrer-Raab effect: The trigger (e.g. a black disc on a screen) is shown only very briefly and 
masked by another, longer displayed signal (e.g. a black ring) so that the trigger will never be 
conscious – afterwards persons say that they have seen the masking signal (ring) but not the trigger 
(disc). In the experiment persons were told to press a button as quickly as possible after seeing 
“the” signal. Now the time between the beginning of the trigger signal and the beginning of the 
masking stimulus varied but the reaction time between the trigger signal and the pressing remained 
constant (mean 160-165 ms) and roughly equal to the reaction time in a control experiment with 
one stimulus only. [Neumann & Prinz 1987, 201 f.] The most obvious explanation of the Fehrer-
Raab effect is: (After forming a distal general intention ‘to press the button immediately after the 
signal’ at the beginning of the experiment when the experimenter explains what the subjects should 
do) the subjects reacted directly to the consciously unperceivable trigger signal; and this excludes 
that in between, after the signal, they first formed a (triggering) conscious proximal intention. A 
final evidence for the lack of proximal intentions in habitualized automatic actions is 
neurophysiological: Stimulus-response routines are stored in the basal ganglia, in particular in the 
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putamen, whereas normal goal-directed actions are controlled in other brain regions, often 
including the prefrontal cortex [Neal et al. 2011, 1429 – with several references]. 
The main functional reason for automaticity is that automatic actions (and automatic 
processes in general) do not consume the very scarce resource of conscious attention so that during 
the execution of the automatism these higher psychic capacities can be used for other tasks [Posner 
& Snyder 1975; Bargh & Chartrand 1999, 464]. As a consequence, automatic reactions are 
mentally effortless. Furthermore, they are much faster than deliberate conscious reactions. Finally, 
automatic behaviour can be executed in parallel without much interference [Neumann 1984, 260-
264]. Generally mentioned disadvantages of automatisms, however, are, first, that they fail in 
complicated processes, second, that they cannot operate in new situations (in new situations 
execution problems often arise, which then attract attention so that the problem can be resolved via 
conscious thinking), third, that they operate rigidly and mechanically even when deviating from the 
rigid rule would be better, e.g. when the automatic behaviour is no longer rewarding, and, fourth, 
that they are susceptible to action slips [Neal et al. 2011, 1429; Graybiel 2008, 363; Reason 1979]. 
So it is part of the very nature of automatic actions that they are triggered and proceed 
unconsciously; they are driven by stimuli not by present intentions [Neumann 1984, 258]. This 
could be an enormous challenge to the traditional picture and treatment of actions:2 Without 
intention there is no reason for which the action has been done, no intentionality, no freedom, no 
responsibility; and in the strict sense there is not even an action; and this would hold for the vast 
majority of what appear to be actions.3 Furthermore, without the interposition of critical and 
constructive conscious processes not only is no creative designing of new options possible, but also 
the search for all kinds of relevant consequences – which requires consciousness as the global 
working place – and the rational assessment of these consequences are omitted [Lumer 2014, 86-
87; 96-100); we are behaving on autopilot and not as agents. Finally, automatisms, and bad habits 
in particular, can even work against our deliberate intentions; we have to suppress them with proper 
conscious efforts [Quinn et al. 2010; Neal et al. 2011, 1436]. Of course, all these features would be 
severe curtailments of rational agency; and some of them may exclude our responsibility. 
To make the challenge by automatic actions for intentionality and responsibility more 
concrete let us modify the above examples, which show the absence of (proximal) intentions from 
automatic actions. A fare dodger habitually uses public transport without paying and circumvents 
                                                 
2
  These days, several psychologists and neuroscientists (e.g. Benjamin Libet [1985], Daniel Wegner [2002, 2; 
65-69; 96; 146; 342], Gerhard Roth [2001, 441-442], Christof Koch, Francis Crick [Koch & Crick 2001]) 
deny a decisive role of intentions for our actions in general. I have replied to such challenges elsewhere 
[Lumer 2014a; 2014b]. But there are also intention sceptics who rely specifically on the discovery of actions’ 
automaticity. Psychologist John A. Bargh, e.g., takes the discovery of the pervasiveness of automatic actions 
to be a confutation of traditional conceptions of action (as well as of free will) [Bargh 2005; 2008]. (His 
reason for this appraisal is that if automatic actions are caused by intentions at all these intentions, according 
to his theory, are unconscious and automatic as well. Bargh’s theory is discussed below (sect. 7).) 
3
  In Western penal law, guilt e.g. presupposes intent or negligence; furthermore, it presupposes mens rea, i.e. 
the knowledge of doing something forbidden, which implies conscious knowledge of what one is doing. The 
reason for these conditions is that threat of punishment can be deterrent only for deeds fulfilling them. 
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possible mechanical controls routinely without conscious thinking. A mafioso has placed a bomb 
under the street to blow up an enemy in his car; the mafioso is waiting with his remote control in a 
place where he has only a view through a narrow slot on the place with the bomb; an accomplice 
watching the street from another place tells him that the enemy is approaching; the mafioso now 
waits for the next car which can be seen through the slot and presses the trigger as fast as possible 
when he acknowledges a car. The fare dodger and the mafioso could both say that they did not act 
on a (proximal) intention but automatically; hence they did not fare-dodge or kill intentionally. If 
that were true the fare dodger under many legislations could not be punished at all; and the mafioso 
could not be punished for murder or manslaughter. A different kind of example is this: Some 
reckless driver habitually drives too fast or in other ways recklessly (e.g. ignores the right of way) 
and one day causes an accident. The usual accusation in such cases is not that the driver caused the 
accident intentionally, but that she caused it at least negligently; the accusation often is not even 
that the driver drove too fast or ignored the right of way intentionally but that she omitted to curb 
the speed or to check for others who might have the right of way and then give way where required. 
Because the charge is that of an omission the challenge by the automaticity of actions in this case is 
not that the driver might not be responsible because she did something without intending it. But 
there is a related problem. The driver could say: ‘Driving a car (like many other activities) is 
mainly automatic; i.e. we cannot intentionally control these activities, at least not for the most part; 
trying to intentionally control them would mean to give them up altogether. Hence it is impossible 
to do the omitted action intentionally; I could not act in the required way, and, therefore, I am not 
responsible either for the accident or for going too fast / driving recklessly. If others do not cause 
accidents etc. they are simply lucky e.g. because they have better automatisms.’ A final example 
concerns a different domain of responsibility. If somebody is obese because she automatically 
ingests all sweet things in reach this is not a problem for legal (penal or civil) responsibility because 
this is not a behaviour regimented by law. However, this automaticity may generate a problem for 
personal, prudential responsibility: If the obese person does not eat intentionally she is not 
prudentially responsible for this part of her life. 
The most general hypothesis in what follows is that in automatic behaviour there is much 
more intention, controllability and responsibility as first it appears to be, with the consequence that 
most of this behaviour is intentional. Some psychologists also see such a connection between 
automatic behaviour and intention. Wood & Neal e.g. write: “Nonetheless, habits interface with 
goals. Constraining this interface, habit associations accrue slowly and do not shift appreciably 
with current goal states or infrequent counterhabitual responses. Given these constraints, goals can 
(a) direct habits by motivating repetition that leads to habit formation and by promoting exposure to 
cues that trigger habits, (b) be inferred from habits, and (c) interact with habits in ways that 
preserve the learned habit associations” [2007, 843]. Neumann states that automatic processes are 
not independent of a person’s intentions and attention [1984, 256]. So there is even explicit support 
from empirical scientists for the general hypothesis elaborated below. However, this elaboration 
itself, i.e. the detailed analysis of the exact role of intentions in automatic behaviour and the 
explanation of why and how far automatic behaviour is intentional, is new and the constructive 
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contribution of this paper. 
3. Circumscribing the Object under Scrutiny – a Definition of ‘Automatic 
Behaviour’ 
There is some discussion in psychology about how ‘automatic behaviour’ should be defined. This 
article does not aim at presenting a substantial contribution to this discussion and will use only a 
working definition, which on the one hand takes up the most important qualities proposed by 
psychologists and, on the other, is suitable for the present discussion in not predetermining the 
question of the intentionality and agential character of automatic behaviour. This working 
definition is: 
 
Automatic behaviour is a (1) behaviour of a kind which in principle is (directly) voluntarily 
controllable, (2) which is unconsciously triggered, (3) brought about in a (more or less) 
reliable way, (4) not initiated by a (proximal) intention, and (5) not consciously controlled 
during its execution. 
 
The condition of basic voluntary controllability (1) –  which does not imply present voluntary 
controllability – shall exclude philosophically unproblematic cases (like reflexes), where, for 
physiological reasons alone, no confusion with actions is possible. Unconscious triggering (2) is 
one of the core conditions of automaticity; it permits the trigger itself to be conscious – we may e.g. 
consciously and attentively perceive a certain signal –; but the subsequent process of triggering 
must not be conscious, it must be automatic – otherwise “automatic” behaviour would be too close 
to paradigmatic cases of deliberate conscious action. Without reliability (3) the behaviour might be 
accidental and hence not automatic. Not being initiated by a proximal (conscious or unconscious) 
intention (4) again excludes paradigms of intentional action 4 and is a requirement of automaticity: 
The very idea and function of intention (in a narrow sense [cf. Lumer 2013]) formation with its 
binding to the subject's desires, its openness to creativity, critical scrutiny and search for relevant 
consequences as well as alternatives preclude its automatisation. Hence permitting automatic 
behaviour to be initiated by a proximal intention, paradoxically would allow “automatic” behaviour 
to be initiated by a non-automatic process. (This does not exclude that unconscious executive states 
that are not intentions in a narrow sense are formed automatically and produce automatic behaviour 
(cf. below, sect. 7).) Finally, lack of conscious control during the execution (5) is the other core 
condition of automaticity. – To be sure, every consciously controlled action includes much 
automatic processing, after all the conscious ego does not think of giving efferent signals to 
                                                 
4
  ‘Intentional action’ has not the same meaning as ‘action’. Though every action must be caused (in the right 
way) by an intention, sometimes actions fail so gravely that no underlying intention is realized. In such a case 
the action is not intentional under any description – though it may still be an action because it has been caused 
by an intention via an action generating mechanism. However, actions which are not intentional under any 
description are rare. So, when I write “intentional action” here (without specifying the content of that 
intention) I only want to stress the most important feature of normal actions, viz. that they realize the causing 
intention (or at least some part of it) in the right way. 
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motoneurons, to inhibit counter-acting muscles etc. But, according to the terminology chosen here, 
these are automatic processes not forms of automatic behaviour. The question about automatic 
behaviour is who has the leadership, and not whether that leader consciously controls the details of 
the execution. This means: The very details of our actions are not consciously controlled – as in a 
big company the CEO does not know the single operations of the workers –; this is a truism and not 
an issue in the debate on automaticity. The question is whether at the top of the executive hierarchy 
there is a conscious intention or an unconscious automatic process [cf. Wilson 2002, ch. 3: Who’s 
in charge?]. 
When psychologists speak of automaticity they usually speak of ‘automatic processes’, 
which is a broader concept than ‘automatic behaviour’ as it has been defined here: First, the genus 
proximum, ‘process’, is much broader than ‘behaviour’, which, according to condition 1 of the 
definition (voluntary controllability), includes only such processes that at least in principle could be 
actions. Second, condition 4, “not initiated by a (proximal) intention”, is motivated by the aim of 
the present philosophical inquiry, namely to discuss behaviour which might be problematic for 
intentional causalism because it is not caused by a “visible” intention though it seems to be an 
action; so this condition, too, makes the concept ‘automatic behaviour’ narrower than the 
psychological concept ‘automatic process’. The remaining three conditions of the definition, 
instead, are broadly accepted by psychologists as well. As a consequence of these determinations, 
the above definition excludes several phenomena that some psychologists include in their 
discussions of automaticity, but which, from the viewpoint of the present philosophical discussion 
belong to quite different categories of, perhaps again, problematic, cases. The most important of 
these excluded phenomena are the following. 1. Conditioned reflexes – like closing one's eye 
automatically after an acoustic signal, if one has previously, several times and regularly been 
exposed to air jets after this acoustic signal – are not automatic behaviour because the underlying 
reflex (closing the eye when feeling the air jet) is not a consciously controlled action in the first 
place. (Implicitly) learned extensions of the conditions under which these reflexes are triggered do 
not make them actions. 2. Primed actions are influenced by automatic processes which intervene on 
the process of intention formation or on the mode of the action's execution, but they are not forms 
of automatic behaviour because they are initiated by conscious proximal intentions (cf. condition 
(3)) and then are, of course, actions. Not even the intention formation underlying a primed action is 
an automatic process since there is only some influence on the decision and not a real automatism 
leading to a stereotypic intention. 3. Unconsciously deliberated actions are unconsciously caused 
by an unconscious intention, which in turn relies on a primitive unconscious deliberation. Since the 
unconscious deliberation leads to an unconscious intention the resulting behaviour, according to the 
above definition, is not automatic. 
Having excluded these three types of behaviour from the present discussion does not mean 
that they are not problematic for intentional causalism. The present point, instead, is only that they 
are not problematic for action philosophy with respect to their possible automaticity. If they are 
problematic – and in particular primed actions as well as unconsciously deliberated actions prima 
facie seem to be so – they are problematic for other reasons and have to be and are discussed in 
LUMER: Automatic Actions – Agency, Intentionality, and Responsibility 8 
other studies (cf. Lumer, under review). On the other hand, the definition of ‘automatic behaviour’ 
does include some processes which are not actions and commonly are also considered to be clear 
cases of non-actions. Therefore, the definition, correctly, does not imply that automatic behaviour 
always is also an automatic action; thus the definition leaves our research question, i.e. whether 
certain kinds of automatic behaviour are actions, open. An example for automatic behaviour (in the 
defined sense) that is not an action is routine respiration. Routine respiration fulfils the four 
standard conditions of automaticity (it is 2. unconsciously triggered, 3. brought about reliably, 4. 
not initiated by a (proximal) intention, and 5. not consciously controlled during its execution) but 
also the first condition (voluntary controllability), since we can voluntarily modulate the rate and 
volume of each breath we take. Hence, routine respiration is an automatic behaviour.  But is it also 
an automatic action? If this were the case respiration could be the model for explaining other types 
of automatic actions. However, the fact that respiration is voluntarily controllable does not imply 
that it is voluntarily controlled in each case; and routine respiration precisely is not voluntarily 
controlled. Furthermore, routine respiration does not originate from some respective intention, not 
even a distal intention. Therefore, it is not intentional, not an action, and we are not responsible for 
it. Thus, automatic respiration cannot be the model for explaining automatic actions. The situation 
is different with consciously controlled respiration, i.e. when we consciously focus on our breathing 
and intentionally modulate it: Now it is consciously triggered by an intention, such that conditions 
2 and 4 of the above definition are no longer fulfilled; therefore, consciously controlled respiration 
is no automatic behaviour. Instead it is an (intentional) action because it is caused (in the right way) 
by a respective intention; and we are responsible for it. So, both kinds of behaviour are categorized 
by our definitions as they should be: Routine respiration is taken as a classical paradigm case of 
mere (automatic) behaviour (i.e. not an action), whereas consciously controlled breathing is 
considered an action.5 Therefore, if the common assessment of the kind of automatic behaviour 
under scrutiny in this article – like automatic walking, driving etc. –, i.e. that they are actions, were 
correct, this behaviour must be different from respiration in some important respect. And the idea is 
that this automatic behaviour, the first impression notwithstanding and in contrast to routine 
respiration, is caused by a somewhat hidden respective intention. 
A similar but more complicated case is conscious mental processes. It is more complicated 
because we have do differentiate: 1. Some mental processes are directly intentionally controllable, 
though often they are not intentionally controlled: e.g. directing and focusing attention, certain 
mental representations (in particular visual and auditory), judging etc. 2. Others are not directly 
intentionally controllable but indirectly with the help of the first group, i.e. directly controllable 
mental processes, and via mechanisms which remain in the mental sphere: e.g. emotions with the 
help of suitable representations; creative inspirations with the help of mentally representing the 
question or (partial) ideas for their solution; memorization with the help of mental repetition, 
concentration and the construction of mnemonic aids etc. 3. And a final group of mental processes 
                                                 
5
  By the way, the same holds for suppressible reflexes like the nocifensive reflex to withdraw our hands when 
we touch something hot. Usually this is a kind of automatic behaviour and not an action. But the reflex can be 
consciously and intentionally suppressed; then the standstill is an action and not an automatic behaviour. 
LUMER: Automatic Actions – Agency, Intentionality, and Responsibility 9 
are intentionally controllable only via intervention on the environment: e.g. the content of our 
sensory perceptions. Groups 2 and 3 do not fulfil the controllability condition 1 of the definition of 
‘automatic behaviour’ and, therefore, are not interesting here. Group 1 instead is relevant in the 
present context but has to be broken down further: 1.1. Many of the processes which are of the 
directly intentionally controllable type in fact are not controlled: our attention is attracted 
involuntarily; ideas, images, phrases pop into our heads etc. Such a process might be automatic; 
and because of its controllability in principle it might be automatic behaviour in the defined sense. 
However, it is not an action because it lacks the intention. This is analogous to routine respiration. 
1.2. If such a process is triggered by an intention instead it is an action. This is analogous to 
intentional respiration. 1.3. Finally, it is possible to always perform such processes intentionally in 
certain situations, which may lead to habitualization and automatization of these processes. Such 
habitualizations are even part of our education, when we are taught to follow certain rules of mental 
behaviour: ‘Before crossing the road, first look left, then look to the right!’ ‘If you want to read a 
text start at the left side of the top line …!’ ‘If you translate a Latin sentence first look for the verb!’ 
‘If you are taking a difficult decision first realize what the relevant options are …’ ‘If you are 
undecided between two options and do not make progress with the decision for some time, and if 
the temporal costs of the decision are no longer proportioned, then take a spontaneous decision in 
that instance (or postpone the decision)!’ What at the beginning is a series of intentional mental 
actions, at the end of the habitualization has become a habit without proximal intentions. This 
implies that the resulting habitual behaviour is automatic behaviour in the defined sense. Whether 
this or other habitual behaviour is an action is an open question, which will be addressed below, in 
section 5.6 
4. Automatic Behaviour, Type 1: Actions Caused but not Triggered by Distal 
Implementation Intentions 
Now, the middle part of this article will discuss the main forms of automatic behaviour: 1. actions 
caused but not triggered by distal implementation intentions, 2.-5. four forms of habits, 6. mimicry, 
and 7. semantically induced automatic behaviour. 
Gollwitzer has distinguished goal intentions from implementation intentions [Gollwitzer 
1999]. Both kinds of intentions are, qua intention, intentions to execute an action, i.e. to do 
something; however, the actions in the two kinds of intentions are described differently. In a goal 
intention they are described via the goal to be reached, i.e., logically conceived, as ‘to execute some 
behaviour x which causes the achievement of goal g’ (where “x” is a variable and “g” is a singular 
                                                 
6
  This analysis and differentiation of mental behaviour also entails an answer to the question of the 
controllability of mental actions, to which some answer in the positive [e.g. Wu 2013], others in the negative 
[e.g. Strawson 2003; Vierkant 2013], and some say in part yes, in part no [e.g. Hieronymi 2009; Mele 2009]. 
Furthermore, the distinction between spontaneous judgements or decisions (group 1.1) on the one hand and 
intended judgements or decisions (group 1.2) on the other resolves the problem of a possible infinite regress 
while leaving the possibility of intentionally deciding to decide intact. 
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term), whereas in an implementation intention the action's parameters are specified in a way that 
they are understandable for the executive system; what is understandable in this way varies with the 
degree of practice. As a consequence, implementation intentions can be directly executed, whereas 
in order to realise the goal intention an appropriate implementation intention has to be formed first. 
Goal intentions often are distal intentions to be executed in the not immediate future, 
implementation intentions instead paradigmatically are proximal intentions to be realised right now. 
However, there are also distal implementation intentions, i.e. intentions whose time index in the 
action description is not ‘right now’ but ‘(immediately after) when event e occurs’ with e being 
some event in the more distant future: ‘I do action A (immediately after) when e occurs’. And the 
interesting critical feature here is that distal implementation intentions can be executed 
automatically, i.e. in particular without first forming a proximal implementation intention; the mere 
observation of e, even the unconscious perception of e, is sufficient to trigger the A-ing. 
Brandstätter et al. [2001, experiment 3] have shown this with laboratory experiments, which were 
specifically designed to occupy the participants' attention with other absorbing tasks and in which 
the specific signals to which the subjects, according to their interesting distal implementation 
intention, should selectively react appeared outside of awareness (in the parafoveal area of the 
visual field, for which it holds that the stimuli presented there “are processed only minimally and 
outside of awareness”). The reaction time after these signals remained the same whether the 
absorbing task was difficult or rather easy – which the authors take to be another proof of the 
automaticity of the distal intention’s execution. An everyday example is to plan to post a letter on 
one's way to work, e.g. holding it ready in the right hand; when one passes the mailbox one inserts 
the letter automatically. Some further examples from the literature of unconscious and automatic 
triggering the execution of distal intentions have already been described in section 2: starting to 
sprint, Fehrer-Raab effect. 
The mechanism behind distal implementation intentions’ automatically causing the intended 
behaviour must be a bit more complex than that of proximal implementation intentions: The distal 
intention – like a proximal intention – is still the behaviour’s structuring cause, thus determining 
how we react on the perception of which signal e. However, the intention no longer triggers the 
intended behaviour but causes a programming of the execution mechanism to trigger the behaviour 
after the perception of event e (signal) mentioned in the action description’s time index – like 
setting an alarm-clock or the timer of some instrument or placing a conditional selling order for 
shares when they fall below a certain threshold. Then this programme is executed more or less 
reliably by the execution mechanism. Many animals are able to learn stimulus-response ties by 
repetition. In the case of distal implementation intentions we seem to be able to simply set such a 
stimulus-response tie by the distal implementation intention. 
According to intentional causalism, actions caused but not triggered by distal 
implementation intentions are, of course, actions in the full sense because they are caused in a non-
deviant way by a corresponding (structuring though not triggering) intention; the definition of 
‘action’ at the beginning of this paper does not say anything about the time lapse between the 
intention and its execution, thus also permitting later executions. Therefore, normally such actions 
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are intentional and, usually, we are responsible for them. This shows that the organisation of our 
actions can be cleverer and more efficient than we usually assume: With the help of distal 
implementation intentions we can program ourselves to act automatically in the future without 
having to spend attentional resources in that moment. 
5. Automatic Behaviour, Types 2-5: Habits 
Habits emerge from the gradual learning of associations between responses and the features of 
performance contexts that have historically co-varied with them (e.g., physical settings, preceding 
actions). Once a habit is formed, perception of contexts triggers the associated response without a 
mediating goal. [Wood & Neil 2007, 843; similar: Shiffrin & Schneider 1977; Bargh & Chartrand 
1999, 468.] Initially the actions are caused by conscious intentions, and their performance is 
consciously controlled as well. However, if the same action is repeated consistently in the same 
type of situation the conscious control diminishes more and more and finally fades away [details: 
Neumann 1984, 280-281]; and at a certain point the conscious intention is no longer necessary for 
causing the now habitualised behaviour [Bargh & Chartrand 1999, 468; Shiffrin & Dumais 1981; 
Shiffrin & Schneider 1977]. Habitualisation itself, in a certain sense, is an automatic process: The 
consistent pairing of certain types of situations and actions is sufficient to gradually establish the 
automatic link between them [Bargh & Chartrand 1999, 469]. As a consequence of its 
automatisation habitual behaviour is triggered independently of present motives by perceiving the 
triggering signal if the behaviour can be executed in its habitualised form. [Neal et al. 2011.] 
The fact that habitualisation works automatically does not imply that it cannot be 
influenced. Above all there are various ways in which the original consistent coupling of specific 
situations and of associated action comes about. Some of them are intentional; and this makes a 
difference for the potential intentionality and quality of being an action as well as for our 
responsibility for them. Therefore, in the following subsections the four most important of these 
ways will be scrutinised separately. In addition to influencing the emergence of habits we can 
interrupt or delete them if we do not want to have them any longer. Psychologists have found 
several strategies for achieving this. First, we can monitor the triggering signals and try to inhibit 
the unwanted response when activated in memory (thinking “don't do it,” watching carefully for 
slip-ups) [Quinn et al. 2010, ]. This strategy, at least for a considerable period of time, requires a 
constant effort. Second, routines can be interrupted by stimulus control, i.e. the environment is 
changed in such a way that the precise situation necessary for triggering the habitual response no 
longer occurs to the subject [Neal et al. 2011, 1436]. 
After this general characterisation of habits we now have to analyse the four ways in which 
they are acquired. 
 
5.1. Automatic Behaviour, Type 2: Intentionally Learned Routines and Skills 
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People, in particular teachers and trainers and, somewhat later, their pupils as well, know – at least 
roughly – about the automaticity of habitualisation and about the advantages of automatic reactions. 
Therefore, they often intend to acquire automation and its beneficial features by deliberately 
repeating and practicing the sequence from the signal to the behaviour until the automatism has 
developed and stabilised. Musicians, gymnasts, learner drivers do so. [Bargh & Chartrand 1999, 
468.] The skills and routines acquired in this way can be independent of a comprehensive action, 
such as wiping one's nose after sneezing, or inserted into bigger actions and used to fulfil respective 
subgoals. In the latter case they also fall under the third category of habits (acquiring routines 
within bigger actions [see subsection 5.3]). 
With respect to the possible intentionality, intentionally learned routine behaviour is a 
simple case. If automaticity acquisition is intended then the agent has a general intention always to 
perform a certain action type A in situations or circumstances of type C. This general intention 
logically extends to every single execution of the automatism. In addition, the instrumental 
habitualisation or learning intention in the end causes these future executions via the intended 
practicing. Once the automatism has been acquired, neither the general intention nor the 
habitualisation intention are triggering causes of the single automatic actions, the latter are 
triggered by the stimulus perception of the stimulus C (which may even be subliminal). However, 
the general intention, nonetheless, is the structuring cause via the habitualisation intention. 
Consequently, this kind of automatic behaviour is caused in a controlled way by a respective 
intention, hence it is an action, intentional, caused by reasons and usually we are responsible for it. 
But it is a clever form of intentional action, which does not need a singular proximal intention to be 
executed. 
 
5.2. Automatic Behaviour, Type 3: Habits Acquired by Repetition Under a General Intention 
The consistent coupling of the situations C and the action A, which leads to habitualisation, can also 
be brought about in a more natural way than just described: We simply have the general intention 
to always A in situations C; because of this intention we then repeatedly do A in situations C – 
perhaps by additionally forming many singular proximal intentions ‘now to do A’ in situations C –; 
and this causes the habitualisation of doing A in situations C. There is no intention to habitualise the 
doing of A in situations C; and we do not undertake any particular actions to establish an 
automatism. The general intention works and is more powerful than it appeared. Some ordinary 
examples of this kind of habit may be greeting other persons, thanking for services obtained, or 
drinking tea at a certain time of day. 
Since there is a general intention always to do A in situations C, which covers all the 
subsequent executions of A in situations C, and because this general intention also causes the later 
habitual executions of A via the just described mechanism, these later executions are intended and 
intentional actions; and usually we are responsible for them. The difference with respect to 
intentionally learning routines is that the habitualisation was not intentional. But this does not 
infringe on the intentionality of the later automatic A-doings. The subject who underwent the 
unintended habitualisation does not know that much about how his general intention brought about 
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his later automatic A-ings, but he is happy with it, and the way it came about is not surprising for 
him; in this sense it is not a deviant way of causing the A-ings [cf. Lumer 2008]. Hence, these A-
ings are intentional. 
 
5.3. Automatic Behaviour, Type 4: Routines within Bigger Actions 
While the other three types of habits exclude each other, the type of habit to be discussed now, i.e. 
routines within bigger actions, has to be combined with one of them and it can be combined with 
each. 
As already said, when we often repeat the same action in the same situation the automation 
takes place even without being intended. A further way in which this can happen is that smaller 
actions are integrated into bigger and repeatedly executed plans so that single stretches within this 
bigger plan, which are themselves composed of several smaller actions, can be automated. After the 
automation the whole plan can be executed in one go and can also be intended in toto. One 
particularity of this setting is that a somewhat more comprehensive intention is part of the identical 
stimulus C which triggers the behaviour sequences; if we do not have this comprehensive intention 
the elementary actions are not released automatically. As a consequence we have prefabricated 
action modules, so to speak, at our disposal. These modules can be intentionally activated in 
isolation or within still more comprehensive plans. This is what happens when we naturally, 
without any intention to practise, learn to walk, to speak, to close a door, to do up the shoelaces, to 
enter our house (go to the door, take out the key, …), switch off the light and lock the door when 
leaving the house. 
Is routine behaviour within bigger actions, i.e. the smaller, automatic element like braking 
or changing gear during one's trip to work, intentional? Is it an action? Even when invited to do so, 
subjects in many cases cannot list the originally elementary actions involved in the comprehensive 
action. Nonetheless, we usually assume the single steps, which once were elementary acts, to be 
intentional – and rightly so for the following reason. Before every execution of the automatism 
there is the molecular implementation intention to do A, which materially implies doing the various 
Ai. Though the agent can no longer recall these material implications, she has known them in detail 
and still has a rough idea of how the molecular action “uncoils”; by her present decision she accepts 
and intends not only the result but (at least) implicitly also the course to it. In the weakest case she 
knows that doing A implies many details she does not remember but after her long experience she 
accepts them – whatever they are. So we might say that in these cases the comprehensive 
implementation intention to do A, which is actually formed before these actions, also includes an 
implicit sequential implementation intention to do the various elementary actions. The latter 
intention makes the singular elementary behaviour intentional and hence an action, for which we 
are usually responsible. 
 
5.4. Automatic Behaviour, Type 5: Habits Acquired Naturally by Independent Repetition 
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The last way considered here of unintentionally acquiring habits is again a form of automatic 
automatisation. However, this time the singular actions whose performance is habitualised are 
isolated; they are neither part of a more comprehensive plan, nor is there a respective general 
intention and still less an intention to habitualise them. The habitualisation is entirely natural in the 
sense of not being intended or sustained by any overarching intention [Shiffrin & Schneider 1977]. 
This implies, in particular, that no intention is part of that situation which later on will be the 
triggering stimulus. Therefore, the naturally automated actions can be triggered without any 
intention or even awareness. This mechanism is at the basis of many habits like pushing one's hair 
up, feeling one's chin or scratching one's head when nervous, hawking to clear one's throat (or to 
make a small pause), wiping away fluffs, biting one's finger nails under stress etc. Even a major 
component of psychic addiction, which also can complement and support physical addiction, 
accrues via this mechanism [Neal & Wood 2008]. As the list suggests, plenty of bad habits are also 
acquired in this way. 
Is habitual behaviour naturally acquired by independent repetition intentional? Is it an 
action? It is not because there is no intention which covers the later automatic behaviour and no 
intention to habitualise this behaviour. Nonetheless, one might try to ascribe intentionality to them 
with the following general induction plus approval argument – which however fails: Repeatedly 
and consistently forming and executing singular intentions to do A in situations C provides the 
content of a hypothetic or implicit general intention; furthermore, not opposing the beginning and 
then successful automation may count as a weak form of implicit approval of the hypothetic general 
intention; therefore, we may assume a kind of generalising induction from the singular intentions to 
the implicit general intention. However, this proposal already suffers from an intensionality 
problem of the ascribed intention. If the subject in situations of type C always intentionally As, the 
behaviour's description as “A” comes from the subject, however the situation's description as “C” is 
ours; and it is not necessarily the case that the subject has any overarching description of the 
situations C in which she As. Furthermore, the general induction argument does not meet the 
conditions of the intentional-causalist definition of ‘action’, according to which in case of an action 
the intention causes the behaviour: An implicit or hypothetical intention cannot cause anything. 
The upshot of this discussion then is that occurrences of habitual behaviour on the basis of 
naturally acquired habits are not actions and are not intentional. However, if we can suppress 
naturally acquired habits – and above (beginning of sect. 5) we have seen that this possibility does 
exist under certain conditions – then we can be responsible for them as well as for the resulting 
habitual behaviour (though neither the habitualisation nor the habitual behaviour in these cases is 
an action) – as we are responsible for many intentional and unintentional omissions, like driving 
with bald tires, not rendering assistance or not paying taxes. 
6. Automatic Behaviour, Type 6: Mimicry 
Mimicry, in its psychological meaning, is the phenomenon that humans imitate other persons 
unconsciously and automatically. Of course, sometimes humans also imitate other people 
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consciously on the basis of a proximal intention; but this is not mimicry in the psychological sense, 
and above all it is not of primary interest in the present context. Mimicry is a pervasive 
phenomenon which can concern many forms of behaviour: verbal behaviour (accent, length of 
pauses and length of utterances, speech rate, syntax), facial expression, many forms of bodily 
behaviour like posture or gestures or personal mannerisms like moving one's foot or touching one's 
face [Chartrand & Dalton 2009, 459-461]. 
A particularly important function of mimicry is recognising the emotions of other persons, 
which works in this way: The subject recognises the other person's facial expression, imitates it 
(often only in a minimalist form); the proprioception of one's own facial expression then induces 
the corresponding but muted emotion, which then is recognised and finally categorised [cf. Walbott 
1991; Adolphs et al. 2000; Neal & Chartrand 2011]. A similar mechanism helps us understand the 
intention of other persons' actions by imitating their movements. So, recognising other persons' 
inner states is one important function of mimicry; another is to produce “social glue” in various 
ways [Chartrand & Dalton 2009, 462]: Perceiving oneself to be mimicked by another person leads 
to a feeling of like-mindedness, of similarity to and of being understood by that person and, 
therefore, also to liking this person more and to establishing a better relation with her as well as to 
being more readily convinced by her arguments because she is more easily considered to be 
trustworthy [Chartrand & Bargh 1999; Chartrand & Dalton 2009, 467]. A third main function of 
mimicry, primarily for children, is to learn certain forms of behaviour and skills by imitating them. 
What is interesting here about mimicry is that mostly it is automatic [Dimberg et al. 2000; 
Chartrand & Bargh 1999]. On the other hand, mimicry is not automatic in the stronger sense of 
“rigid” and “stereotypic”; it is modulated by many factors. (High self-monitors mimic much more 
than low self-monitors [Cheng & Chartrand 2003]; people looking for affiliation mimic more than 
those who do not [ibid.]; experimental subjects in a “worker” position mimic more than those in a 
“leader” role [ibid.]; persons self-reporting much perspective taking of others mimic more than 
those with little perspective taking [Chartrand & Bargh 1999].) 
The functionality of mimicry invites two main interpretations. Mimicry might be caused by 
hard-wired brain processes brought about by biological evolution, or it might be the (intentional or 
unintentional) result of intentional actions. Accordingly, in order to be able to judge about the 
possible intentionality of automatic mimicry we need to know the mechanism through which 
mimicry is brought about. There are three possible explanations, where the third explanation may 
be combined with the second. 
1. Physiologically fixed wiring: Chartrand & Bargh [1999; reproposal: Chartrand & Dalton 
2009] have proposed a hard-wired physiological “perception-behaviour link”, which they 
concretise by referring to mirror neurons, the ideomotor theory of action and various other 
empirical results. According to the theory, sharing of brain resources by perception processing and 
by behaviour generation makes it likely that if a person perceives the execution of a certain 
behaviour she behaves in the same way [Chartrand & Dalton 2009, 472-474]. – However, the 
perception-behaviour-link theory has several and in part fatal defects. First, the physiological 
mechanism is, cautiously formulated, only sketched but by no means specified. Second, mimicry of 
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visually perceived behaviour includes several switches of the representation mode: The visually 
perceived behaviour must be matched with a visual representation of one's own analogous 
behaviour, which in turn has to be “translated” into a motor or proprioceptive representation of 
one's behaviour – presumably located in the mirror neurons of one's premotoric fields –; only then 
can some sort of motoric go signal be released. These switches are usually held to be learned 
ontogenetically in the course of the first year by respective experiences of co-variation. How can a 
theory of a physiologically hard-wired perception-behaviour link explain these facts? More 
generally, there is evidence that mirror neurons are modulated by experience (there is e.g. more 
mirror activation in pianists than in non-pianists during observation of piano playing; there are even 
counter-mirror neurons, which are the result of observing one action and executing a different 
action – e.g. I grasp an object while you release it) – which is hardly compatible with the 
hypothesis of an inborn fixed wiring [Heyes 2010, 579-580]. Third, as the reported results about the 
modulation of mimicry by present intentions, character traits, situation perception etc. show, there 
is at least a lot of interference of psychological processes in the mimicry process, which again is 
hardly compatible with the physiological perception-behaviour hypothesis. 
2. Initial mimicry disposition: There might be an inborn mimicry disposition which loses its 
force and eventually may fade out entirely when children advance in age and are increasingly able 
to mimic intentionally. The disposition may be weak, intentionally suppressible, and its execution 
may depend on learning how to imitate other persons. Acting out the disposition would not be an 
action because it is not caused by an intention with a representation of the behaviour to be executed 
etc., instead it would be more like the working of e.g. the sucking reflex. Of course, this is a very 
speculative hypothesis. However, something like this is necessary to fill the explanatory gap before 
the beginning of more sophisticated, intentional forms of mimicry. 
3. Instrumental mimicry plus habitualisation: The initial-mimicry-disposition hypothesis 
can explain only early but not later, much more modulated mimicry. It must be complemented by 
an explanation covering the latter manifestations of mimicry. In recent times mimicry mechanisms 
have usually been studied in adults, where the mechanisms are mostly automatised and ossified. To 
have a look at children's and teenagers' mimetic behaviour may be a better access for understanding 
the origin of these mechanisms. In this developmental period, however, there is not only much 
more mimicry than later, lots of it, obviously, is also driven by conscious intentions. Toddlers and 
kindergartners imitate demonstrated behaviour to learn it; they copy adult behaviour to feel grown-
up; preschoolers precisely mimic interesting behaviour to know how it feels; elementary school 
children begin to imitate their peers because they want to be like them; pubescent children 
strengthen this tendency and try to establish rather intimate and exclusive friendships by imitating 
each other – thereby they learn the skills to gain sympathy by mimicry etc. There is so much 
intentional mimicry; much of it will be habitualised via one of the four previously discussed types 
of habitualisation. Much of it will be counteracted or given up later because it is childish, no longer 
fashionable etc. However, some habitualised forms of mimicry will remain, in particular those 
which turned out to be instrumentally valuable even for adults. 
So, my hypothesis on how to explain automatic mimicry is a combination of the last two 
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mechanisms: Automatic mimicry, in early childhood, results from the initial mimicry disposition 
and, later, from instrumental mimicry plus habitualisation. The answer to the question of whether 
automatic mimicry in adults, which originates only in the second mechanism, is intentional or 
agential and whether we are responsible for it, then is already implied by the above section on 
habits (sect. 5): Intentionally learned mimicry, mimicry acquired by repetition under a general 
intention and routine mimicry within bigger actions are intentional and actions, and, under normal 
conditions, we usually are responsible for them; however, mimicry naturally acquired by 
independent repetition is not intentional and not an action, though we often are responsible for it. 
7. Automatic Behaviour, Type 7: Semantically Induced Automatic Behaviour 
Bargh has proposed still another mechanism of automatic behaviour: automatic action via auto-
motives: A “goal” is activated unconsciously not by an “act of will” but by situational features, e.g. 
priming; subsequently the “goal” produces the same effect as if it were put into motion 
intentionally; in several experiments none of the subjects reported to have pursued the goal 
hypothesised by the experimenter. Some experimental examples are: When primed (even 
subliminally) by words from the lexical field of ‘achievement’ subjects produced better results in a 
verbal task or they cheated in order to improve their scores. [Bargh 1989; 1990; Bargh & Chartrand 
1999, 469-473.] With “goal” Bargh, unusually, means a certain mental state. According to one 
interpretation, this state might be a goal intention; then, however, the described mechanism would 
not produce automatic behaviour in the above sense (condition 4 would be violated). Since Bargh 
distinguishes between a “goal” and an “act of will” he seems to mean something else, which I 
would interpret as a non-volitive executive mental state, i.e. a state that represents a goal-directed 
behaviour and usually causes this behaviour in an organised way (hence it is an executive mental 
state) but it lacks the volitive dimension of intentions and hence is not an intention because it has 
not developed from desires, so that no optimality belief about the executed behaviour corresponds 
to it [cf. Lumer 2005; 2013]. A particular feature of Bargh's examples is that the executive state is 
activated by semantic association. Therefore, I call the mechanism under discussion “semantically 
induced automatic behaviour” and its key state “semantically induced executive state”. 
These conceptual differentiations also help to systemise the various kinds of automatic 
behaviour. Much automatic behaviour is caused in an organised way by non-volitive executive 
states. The executive state is activated in various ways: 1. In actions caused by distal 
implementation intentions, as a consequence of a respective programming by the distal intention, 
perceiving a specific stimulus activates the executive state. 2.-5. In habitual behaviour as a 
consequence of a respective programming by (intended or unintended) habitualisation, perceiving a 
specific stimulus activates the executive state. (However, the final stage of habitualisation may 
imply shortcutting the process of action production to such a degree that even executive states in 
the form of unconscious goal representations are skipped.) 6. In automatic natural mimicry, as a 
consequence of an inborn mimicry disposition, perceiving the action to be mimicked activates the 
executive state. 7. Finally, in semantically induced automatic behaviour, semantic inputs 
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associatively activate a representation of the later executed behaviour, which then activates the 
respective executive state. Now however, it is unclear why and on which basis the behaviour 
representation activates the executive state – after all, prima facie, this activation is pathological 
(pace ideomotor theory): if every action representation caused the represented action, we could e.g. 
not deliberate about which course of action to take. Bargh is silent on this question. If the transition 
is due to arousal of a respective desire the resulting executive state probably is a proximal intention 
and the generated behaviour no longer automatic. If the transition is due to some confusion the 
reliability condition of the definition of ‘automatic behaviour’ is not met. Both of these possibilities 
are sometimes empirically real but they are not cases of automatic behaviour. 
The kernel of Bargh's examples which might be semantically induced automatic behaviour 
consists of unconsciously modulating choices of actions to be taken on independent grounds; e.g. 
fulfilling a verbal task is modulated to be done with more effort. So far there is no example where a 
fresh behaviour is automatically started from scratch by semantic induction – which would be the 
only way to prove that behaviour can be automatically induced without mediation by proximal 
intentions. 
Altogether then, semantically induced automatic behaviour so far is only a hypothesis, 
which is still explanatorily incomplete (how does the behaviour representation activate the 
executive state?) and insufficiently sustained by experiments. However, it has not been falsified 
either and not yet studied sufficiently, such that it remains an interesting hypothesis. Because of the 
explanatory gap, unfortunately, there is no basis to decide whether the step from behaviour 
representation to an executive state might rely on some (earlier) intention, which could make 
semantically induced automatic behaviour agential, or whether we can intentionally prevent this 
step, such that we might be responsible for not preventing it and indirectly responsible for the 
automatic behaviour itself. 
8. Other Philosophical Approaches to Automatic Actions 
The broad survey of various forms of automatic behaviour has to stop here. Before considering the 
consequences for the intentionality of automatic behaviour and our responsibility for it, a brief 
discussion of some competing philosophical explanations and assessments of automatic behaviour 
may elucidate some merits of the analysis provided here. 
Perhaps the best-known approach, which also tries to explain automatic behaviour, is 
Gendler's conception of “aliefs” [Gendler 2008,]. Aliefs, according to Gendler, are fundamental 
(i.e. irreducible) mental states with a representational, affective and conative content and function 
[ibid. 641; 643-644]; someone walking on a “skywalk” with a glass floor over a chasm may e.g. 
alieve: ‘Really high up, long long way down. Not a safe place to be! Get off!!’ [ibid. 635]. Aliefs 
are associative, automatic and arational; and they may be in contrast to our conscious beliefs – as in 
the example just given the belief that the “skywalk” is safe –, and thus lead to otherwise 
unexplainable behaviour [ibid. 641; 642; 646]. Gendler proposes to explain also automaticity in 
action with the help of aliefs, especially experimental examples provided by Bargh [e.g. Bargh et 
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al. 1996], such as priming subjects with the concept of ‘politeness’, which, unnoticed by the 
subjects, leads to more polite behaviour [ibid. 656-661]. Now, apart from the fundamental doubt 
whether aliefs exist at all, whether they are not reducible e.g. to causally connected primitive 
beliefs, emotion inducing valuations and desires, the more specific concern in the present context is 
that all examples of automatisms brought forward by Gendler include priming before a conscious 
decision which causes a somewhat modified but consciously triggered behaviour. These examples 
may involve automatic processes, but because the action is caused by a conscious proximal 
intention, according to the above definition, they do not instantiate automatic behaviour. Perhaps 
the set of Gendler's examples is chosen too narrowly, and the conception of ‘alief’ by itself has the 
potential to serve to explain also automatic behaviour. However, there are three strong reasons to 
doubt also this hypothesis. First, ‘automatic behaviour’ has been defined above in a way which 
excludes involvements of many kinds of mental events (conscious triggering, causation by a 
proximal intention, conscious guidance during execution). Aliefs, however, are defined as “thick” 
mental states with emotional and conative components, whose intervention would probably lead to 
at least conscious traces and / or intervention on one of the excluded processes. Second, the 
conative component of aliefs is comparable to desires about certain outcomes of actions but not 
about situation-specific actions themselves (perhaps apart from negative actions, i.e. omissions). 
Hence for causing a (positive) action they need to be brought together with representations of 
presently possible actions and perhaps considerations of other aspects of these actions. Even if this 
kind of elaboration were unconscious it would probably involve a newly formed (unconscious) 
proximal intention, causing an unconsciously deliberated action, which, however, by definition is 
not automatic behaviour. Third, in any case, the types of automatic behaviour analysed above 
(sections 4-7) cannot be explained by aliefs; they are too automatic for permitting the intervention of 
a further and so massive mental state involving affective and desiderative components. 
Roughley has proposed Bargh's auto-motives as a general solution to the problem of 
automatic behaviour for intentional-causalist theories of action [Roughley 2007]: The intentions are 
there, they are only unconscious. Problems with this proposal are, however: First, the mechanism of 
semantically induced automatic behaviour, according to what has been said in the last section, so 
far is only hypothetical; hence the proposal is based more on a hope than on empirical evidence. 
Second, even if semantically induced automatic behaviour (Bargh's auto-motives) exists it would 
(also according to Bargh himself) be only one of several mechanisms of automatic behaviour; and 
the challenge for intentional causalism would be unanswered for the quantitatively far more 
important set of automatic behaviour. Third, after the analysis in the last section, Bargh's auto-
motives are (semantically induced) mere executive states, which, however, according to the more 
demanding requirements of intentional causalism (cf. above, sect. 1), are not yet intentions. 
Therefore, Roughley's proposal would not meet the challenge for intentional causalism even for this 
small group of automatic behaviour. 
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9. Intentionality of Automatic Actions and Responsibility for Them 
Let us take stock. There may be some further types of automatic behaviour, but the quantitatively 
most important probably were included in the above enquiry. The results regarding the 
intentionality and the agential character of the different forms of automatic behaviour were these. 
Most automatic behaviours, namely actions caused by distal implementation intentions (type 1), 
intentionally learned routine actions (type 2), habitual actions acquired by repetition under a 
general intention (type 3) and routine actions within molecular actions (type 4) as well as the 
mimicry versions of the latter three forms of habitual actions (types 6.2-6.4), have been found to be 
intentional and actions, which usually implies the agent's responsibility for them. Habitual 
behaviours acquired naturally by independent repetition (type 5) as well as the mimicry version of 
them (type 6.5), however, are neither intentional nor actions, though the agent is, nonetheless, often 
responsible for them (e.g. if the agent is able to suppress them and socially required to do this). 
Only behaviour emerging from the initial mimicry disposition (type 6.1) is neither intentional nor 
an action and we are not responsible for it; however, this type of behaviour already fades out during 
childhood. Finally, semantically induced automatic behaviour (type 7) is still too unclear (whether 
it exists and how it works) for assessing whether it is agential or whether we can be responsible for 
it. 
With these explanations also the examples introduced above for illustrating the challenge by 
automatic actions can easily be explained such that the challenge dissolves: The fare dodger and 
the obese act habitually, and their habit originally is based on their intention such that their habitual 
actions are intentional and they are responsible for it. The reckless driver is right in saying that she 
could not act differently in the specific situation. But she could have and was required much earlier 
to intentionally habitualize a more considerate style of driving. Because she omitted this she is 
indirectly responsible for her reckless driving and for the accident. The mafioso, finally, did not 
have a proximal intention to press the trigger for blowing up his enemy. But he had a distal 
intention to do just this (the last time occurrent when the accomplice tells him that the enemy is 
approaching). And because this distal intention causes the respective behaviour in the right way this 
behaviour is an intentional action, and the mafioso is responsible for it. 
The criterion for the just repeated action and intentionality attributions was intentional 
causalism: a behaviour is intentional if it is caused in a non-deviant way by a corresponding 
intention. Here is not the place to discuss this criterion. However, there are some intentionality 
attributions which even a proponent of intentional causalism may find problematic. One is this: 
Since after habitualisation, habitual actions function independently of the respective intention, for 
some time they may be executed automatically even against a newly formed opposite intention. 
Nonetheless, according to the criterion used here, this automatic behaviour would count as 
intentional because of the original intention (if the habit was acquired via intentional habitualisation 
or under a general intention). This seems to be odd.7 The appearance of oddity in such cases, 
                                                 
7
  Bruno Verbeek raised this objection in a personal conversation. 
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however, is not due specifically to automaticity but, more generally, due to, first, the (long) interval 
between the intention and its intended actional or further consequences, which allows the agent to 
change her mind in the meantime, and, second, to the ballistics of the process leading from the 
intention to the originally intended consequences, which after a certain point forestalls to retract 
them and to block their realisation. There are other (i.e. without automaticity) situations with the 
same features – someone has signed an irrevocable long-term contract or posted a letter, shot an 
arrow or said something in a media conference, which she now, even before the planned effects 
(i.e. the contract conditions to be fulfilled, the letter arriving at its destination, the arrow striking the 
target, the greater public hearing the message) occur, finds problematic. With respect to such 
situations we do not hesitate to consider the action or its planned consequences to be intentional 
though the agent has now changed the action's evaluation and would like to retract it – e.g. because 
she now has learned about originally unforeseen further consequences (which, of course, are not 
intentional). The systematic reason for this, prima facie paradoxical, intentionality attribution is 
again intentional causalism and hence secunda facie quite plausible: the later, planned event (unlike 
the originally unforeseen consequences) is exactly what the agent intended and was caused by the 
intention in the right way. The only problem is that the intention is more powerful than the agent 
likes in this situation – but only in this situation. The same reasoning should hold for habitualised 
automatic actions as consequences of intentional habitualisation. However, one lesson to be learned 
from such cases – like in legal matters – is: be careful with habitualisations because of their 
powerful dynamics. 
That we have no occurrent intention when starting or executing the respective behaviour is a 
defining feature of automatic action, but often we do not even know this intention if we are asked 
for it right after the behaviour and often we even know nothing about the automatic behaviour 
itself. Then a further objection is: How can such automatic behaviour be an action? The reason for 
this ignorance mainly is that the intention which, according to the present proposal, in case of 
automatic actions is the cause of the respective behaviour was occurrent only too long ago and that 
to know it is of no help for executing the behaviour; hence forgetting it is a relief for our memory. 
Sometimes we need such knowledge in order to give an account of our action or to be able to 
change our habits; but in such cases mostly a rough idea of the action and its intention is sufficient 
to serve these purposes, and this rough idea often is still present. So, altogether this ignorance can 
sometimes be a – marginal – handicap but on the contrary it is usually advantageous. What is really 
important for the sense and essence of intentional actions is that the intention causes the respective 
behaviour (in the right way); this condition, however, is fulfilled by automatic actions. Au 
contraire, the existence of automatic actions shows that this essence can also be realised in a very 
powerful way with long-range control of our behaviour and without any need to further consciously 
care about its execution. 
One might be tempted to summarise the just developed results on the responsibility for our 
automatic behaviour by saying that we are virtually always responsible for it. However, this would 
be grossly false. First, adults are usually responsible for their intentional actions; they can also be 
responsible for omissions and unprevented events but only under specific conditions in a limited 
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number of cases. Responsibility for mere automatic behaviour is only an indirect responsibility 
resting on the responsibility for having forborne to eliminate the automatism. In order to have the 
latter, direct responsibility, the agent must command effective means of elimination, which she 
does not always have at hand, and she must have the moral, legal or something like a prudential 
positive duty to eliminate the automatism. The reason for this strong restriction is this: As just has 
been said, we can be responsible for omissions (even unintended omissions) and for preventable but 
unprevented events; but the set of omissions and preventable but unprevented events is so huge that 
we cannot be responsible for all of them. We are responsible only for a small subset, namely those 
omissions and unprevented events for which a corresponding positive duty of action and prevention 
respectively exists. [Lumer 2012] The unprevented event in our case is the automatic behaviour, 
and the omission consists in not stopping the automatism. Therefore, we are morally / legally 
(indirectly) responsible for this automatic behaviour if we have effective and sensible means to stop 
it and if this behaviour is morally / legally obligatory or prohibited; and we are prudentially 
(indirectly) responsible for it if we have effective and sensible means to stop it and if this behaviour 
is particularly good and rational or rather harmful or irrational. 
Second, we are mostly directly responsible for our automatic actions but not always. A very 
important group of such cases where we are not directly responsible is habits acquired in periods of 
reduced or non-responsibility, in particular during childhood and early adolescence. Many habits 
are acquired during childhood even on the basis of general intentions (though the share of naturally 
acquired habits at this age will be bigger than it is in adults), so that their later execution, according 
to the above discussion, is intentional and each time an action. Since children are not yet 
responsible or responsible only to a reduced degree they may not be responsible for the 
habitualisation. And this lack of responsibility may extend to a lack of direct responsibility for the 
later automatic action even of the adult. This, however, does not preclude that the adult has an 
indirect responsibility for his automatic action in the way analysed in the last paragraph. 
Knowledge about secondary responsibility and about effective means against undesired 
automatisms should prompt one to check one's automatisms for their adequacy and to perhaps 
change them. 
The foregoing considerations show that it is important to distinguish the various 
automatisms and their origins in order to be able to attribute intentionality, agential character and 
direct or indirect responsibility. 
10. Conclusion 
The result of the above discussion is that most forms of automatic behaviour are intentional actions, 
for which we are usually responsible, and that we are also responsible for much of the remaining 
automatic behaviour. This is good news. Remember, intentionality in the explained strong sense 
guarantees that our ego, with which we identify ourselves, controls our behaviour, so that with the 
explanation given above, which identifies the intention behind automatic actions, even these actions 
in most cases are under our control. Furthermore, this ego is rational to a certain degree and so far 
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also sensible to reasons given by society, which in turn makes subjects responsible. Therefore, the 
concern that, through the discovery of its automaticity, 95% of the behaviour which has so long 
been taken to be actions, may prove not to be intentional, or not actions, or not something for which 
we can be responsible or which is done for reasons, turns out to be unfounded. Hence there is no 
reason, at least this concern isn't one, to abandon or to fundamentally revise the intentional-
causalist concept of action or, what is more, our everyday and legal practice of ascribing 
responsibility and reasons to actions. 
However, the survey also revealed that the mechanism of intentional agency at several 
points, via automatisms, is more powerful than usually assumed. That we can intentionally acquire 
automatic routine actions, which later relieve us from conscious control of these actions, was no 
real news. However the findings about the implications of the other mechanisms probably have 
more news value for most of us: Distal implementation intentions are a sort of self-programming 
for the future and can be executed independently of a reformulation as present implementation 
intentions; repeatedly acting under a general intention can lead to a respective habitualisation with 
the consequence of automatically executing these actions without further intentional approval; the 
same holds for repeatedly executing routine sequences in molecular actions and for often repeating 
the same action in the same situation. This, newly acquired, knowledge about the greater impact of 
our intentional actions should also be an admonition to be careful in forming intentions and 
executing actions which can have this additional power. And the fact that habits continue 
automatically without needing a further intentional approval as well as the possibility that even an 
intentionally acquired habit later on may no longer fit to the intentions and interests changed or 
developed in the meantime should be a warning to occasionally check whether one's habits are still 
adequate and, if the result is negative, to possibly counteract them with the help of the strategies 
explained above. 
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